According to the research works of the literatures on chaotic cryptanalysis, many recent chaotic image encryption algorithms cannot resist chosen-plaintext attack. Although some chaotic image encryption algorithms introduce plain-image information, they still violate some design requirements of modern cryptosystems. Therefore, after analyzing many literatures related to chaotic image encryption, we propose a plain-image-related chaotic image encryption algorithm based on the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequence operation and discrete logarithm. As we know, the discrete logarithm calculation is a complex non-linear calculation, introducing it can increase the complexity of the encryption process. More importantly, discrete logarithm values are significantly different under different generators, and the multiplicative group adopted in the proposed algorithm has as many as 128 generators. Therefore, by using two generators determined by the secret key and the hash value of the plain-image respectively, we not only expand the key space, but also greatly improve the plain-image sensitivity and plain-image relevancy of the encryption process. In addition, the proposed algorithm improves the way of using the hash value of the plain-image. In this way, once the secret key is selected, chaotic sequences can be generated in advance and reused to improve the encryption efficiency. Similarly, the proposed algorithm also introduces the DNA sequence operation with high parallelism to further improves the encryption efficiency. Simulation tests and comparative analyses show that the proposed algorithm can not only resist common attacks, but also outperform some recent chaotic image encryption algorithms in many aspects. INDEX TERMS Chaotic system, chosen-plaintext attack, cryptanalysis, discrete logarithm, DNA sequence operation, image encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
In today's highly informationalized era, all aspects of the people's daily life are inseparable from ubiquitous network information technology. Globally, network information technology has been integrated into almost every industry and field. Because of this, in the application process of network information technology, how to protect image data in The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Andrea F. F. Abate . increasingly frequent network communications more securely and more efficiently has attracted the attention of more and more researchers [1] - [5] . Different from text data, Image data has the intrinsic features of high information redundancy, strong inter-pixel correlation, large data volume etc. Rather than directly adopting traditional encryption algorithms such as the data encryption standard (DES) and advanced encryption standard (AES) developed for text data, many researches have tried to improve the security and efficiency of image encryption by proposing new VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ image encryption algorithms based on new technologies and methods [3] - [12] . Among these new image encryption algorithms, chaotic image encryption algorithms have attracted extensive attention. As a nonlinear phenomenon, chaotic systems have some inherent features, such as the sensitivity to initial state values and control parameters, as well as the internal randomness and ergodicity of system state values, which make them ideal choices for designing new image encryption algorithms [2] - [5] . Actually, since the classical permutation-diffusion chaotic image encryption structure was proposed in 1998 [13] , chaotic image encryption has become a research hotspot. In recent two decades, thousands of chaotic image encryption algorithms have been proposed. And in order to continuously improve the efficiency and security of chaotic image encryption, many new chaotic image encryption algorithms are proposed every year [5] , [14] - [16] . We can briefly introduce some recent chaotic image encryption algorithms: Based on a simple perceptron model, Wang et al. [17] propose a chaotic image encryption algorithm, in which a high-dimensional chaotic system is used to generate pseudo-random sequences, and a nonlinear strategy is adopted to generate the weights of neurons; In [18] , a stream cipher algorithm based on one-time keys and two chaotic maps is presented. In this algorithm, the piecewise linear chaotic map (PWLCM) is used to generate pseudo-random key stream sequences, and the initial conditions of chaotic maps are generated from the MD5 hash values of mouse positions; Liu and Wang [19] present a color image encryption scheme based on the bit-level permutation and high-dimension chaotic map. In this scheme, the color plain-image of size M × N is firstly converted into the grayscale image of size M × 3N , then transformed into the binary matrix and permuted by the scrambling mapping. Finally, Chen system is used to confuse and diffuse the red, green and blue components simultaneously; Liu et al. [20] put forward a confusion and diffusion method for image encryption, which confuses the pixels by transforming the nucleotide into its base pair for random times, and generates the new keys according to the plain-image and common keys; In order to improve the efficiency of chaotic image encryption, and make it suitable for the applications such as the fast encryption in real-time systems, Wang et al. [21] propose a permutation algorithm combining the cyclic shift and sorting. In addition, they also propose a parallel diffusion method which guarantees the parallelism of diffusion and greatly improves the efficiency over traditional streaming diffusion methods; Wang et al. [22] encode the plain-image into a DNA matrix and scramble it. And then they combine the DNA matrix generated by a coupled map lattice (CML) system to diffuse the scrambled DNA matrix; Sun [23] suggests a hyper-chaotic image encryption algorithm based on the scramblings and DNA encoding. Firstly, he implements the scrambling operations to permute the plain-image. Then, the DNA encoding, DNA exclusive or (XOR) operation, and DNA complementary rules are adopted to improve the security of the encryption process; Zhu et al. [24] put forward an image encryption algorithm based on two-dimensional (2D) logistic-modulatedsine-coupling-logistic chaotic map (LSMCL) and with two rounds of permutation-diffusion process. They first use the secret key to generate the initial values and control parameters of LSMCL, and then permutate the plain-image with the chaotic matrix generated by LSMCL. At last, they use two different chaotic matrices generated by LSMCL to diffuse the intermediate cipher pixels; Using one chaotic map generated by the cosine-transform-based chaotic system (CTBCS), Hua et al. [25] propose an image encryption algorithm. In their algorithm, a scrambling process is used to separate adjacent pixels, and a random order substitution process is utilized to spread a small change in the plain-image to all pixels of the cipher-image; In [26] , an image encryption algorithm based on the hyper-chaotic Lorenz system is theoretically developed and experimentally verified. This algorithm adopts the hierarchical diffusion and non-sequential encryption mechanism to complete the encryption process; Hua et al. [27] present an chaotic image encryption algorithm designed to protect medical images. In their algorithm, they first insert some random data into the surroundings of the plain-image. Then, they utilize two rounds of scrambling and pixel adaptive diffusion to shuffle neighboring pixels and spread these inserted random data; In [28] , an image encryption algorithm based on the DNA sequence operation and chaotic systems is presented. In this algorithm, the encryption architecture of permutation and diffusion is adopted. And the 256-bit hash value of the plain-image is used as the secret key; Chai et al. [29] propose a hyper-chaotic color image encryption scheme based on the dynamic DNA encoding. The scheme first adopts a simultaneous intra-intercomponent permutation mechanism to permutate each components of color images, then uses a diffusion mechanism based on random numbers to diffuse intermediate cipherimages; In [30] , a double color image encryption scheme based on the three-dimensional (3D) brownian motion is presented. In this scheme, the bit planes of the intermediate cipher-image are transformed into a 3D bit matrix, and then the 3D brownian motion confusion and block confusion are carried out; Chai et al. [31] put forward a hyper-chaotic color image encryption algorithm based on the genetic recombination. In their algorithm, the compound bit planes and key streams are confused according to the principles of the genetic recombination; Wang et al. [32] propose a chaotic image encryption scheme based on the DNA sequence operation. In this scheme, the confused image is converted into the DNA matrix by using a kind of DNA encoding rule, and after the permutation and another confusion, the DNA matrix is decoded into the cipher-image.
While chaotic image encryption algorithms are constantly proposed, cryptanalysis research against chaotic image encryption algorithms is also in progress. In recent years, many chaotic image encryption algorithms have been cracked [5] , [15] , [16] , [33] - [47] . For examples, Li et al. [36] cryptanalyze a chaotic image encryption algorithm whose chaotic sequences are generated by a simple nonlinear first-order time-delay system, and point out three defects of this algorithm; Hu et al. [37] cryptanalyze a chaotic image cipher using the latin-square-based confusion and diffusion. And they demonstrate that the cipher can be broken by chosen-plaintext attack combined with chosen-ciphertext attack; Wen et al. [38] investigate the security of a hyper-chaotic image encryption algorithm with an architecture of permutation and diffusion. And this image encryption algorithm has been demonstrated insecure against chosen-plaintext attack; Li et al. [39] identify three security problems of an image encryption scheme based on the hybrid hyper-chaotic system and cellular automata. They find that equivalent permutation key streams and equivalent diffusion key streams can be obtained by chosen-plaintext attack; In [40] , the security properties of a chaotic image encryption algorithm based on information entropy is scrutinized, and some common security problems in chaotic image encryption are also pointed out; Zhu et al. [41] cryptanalyze an image encryption algorithm based on an improved chaotic tent map. And they successfully break the image encryption algorithm by using chosen-plaintext attack; In [42] , an image encryption algorithm based on integrated chaotic systems are comprehensively investigated, and some problems identified in this encryption algorithm are pointed out. Then, based on the cryptanalysis against this algorithm, a chosenplaintext attack algorithm is proposed; Feng et al. [43] point out some problems found in a hyper-chaotic image encryption algorithm based on the DNA encoding and scrambling, and then cryptanalyze it and put forward a chosen-plaintext attack algorithm; In [44] , a recently reported chaotic image encryption scheme named 2D logistic-adjusted-sine-mapbased image encryption scheme (LAS-IES) is comprehensively investigated, and some security, practicability, and rationality problems are found. After making some improvements on the practicability and rationality, they cryptanalyze the scheme and propose a corresponding attack algorithm.
Based on above cryptanalysis works [5] , [15] , [16] , [33] - [47] , combined with our own analyses on many recent chaotic image encryption algorithms [1] - [4] , [7] , [9] - [12] , [17] - [28] , [48] - [58] , we find that these algorithms can be further improved in the following aspects: 1) Equivalent key streams are independent of plain-images or only have weak relevancies, so some encryption algorithms cannot resist chosen-plaintext attack.
2) The representations of the secret keys are floating-point numbers rather than binary numbers, which makes both the key sensitivity analyses and key space analyses problematic. 3) There are a large number of equivalent secret keys in key spaces, which brings security risks. At the same time, this also makes the key sensitivity analyses completely unfounded, since the encryption effects of different secret keys are exactly the same.
4)
One-time pad (OTP) secret key designs are not practical in applications where a large number of images need to be encrypted. 5) The uses of external random values or secret parameters violate the Kerckhoffs' principle, making the security of some encryption algorithms dependent on external random values or secret parameters rather than secret keys. 6) The hash values of plain-images or plain-image information are used to generate or perturb chaotic system parameters, so the chaotic sequences used for encryption need to be regenerated when each plain-image is encrypted. As a result, the efficiency advantages of some chaotic image encryption algorithms are not obvious [16] . In order to further improve the rationality, practicability, and security of chaotic image encryption, this paper proposes a plain-image-related chaotic image encryption algorithm based on the DNA sequence operation and discrete logarithm (DD-PCIE). In each step of its encryption process, DD-PCIE not only utilizes the hash value of the plain-image to enhance its plain-image sensitivity and plain-image relevancy, but also introduces the discrete logarithm to improve the complexity of its encryption process. Therefore, DD-PCIE can effectively resist chosen-plaintext attack. Different from the previous chaotic image encryption algorithms, DD-PCIE has the following features and advantages: 1) DD-PCIE performs the plain-image-related pixel value update in the permutation process, which is based on the nonlinear discrete logarithm calculation. Thus, attackers can not arbitrarily utilize special plain-images to initiate effective attacks. 2) In the permutation process of DD-PCIE, in addition to the chaotic sequence, the hash value of the plain-image also participates in the generation of permutation coordinates. Therefore, even if attackers had obtained the permutation coordinates corresponding to special plain-images, they cannot apply these coordinates to recover normal plain-images.
3) The DNA encoding and decoding rules adopted in the plain-image-related DNA sequence operation of DD-PCIE are dependent on the hash value of the plain-image and based on the nonlinear discrete logarithm calculation. 4) In the plain-image-related diffusion of DD-PCIE, the diffusion directions and specific diffusion methods are also related to the plain-image hash value and based on the nonlinear discrete logarithm calculation. 5) DD-PCIE has improved the secret key representations of some chaotic image encryption algorithms, which not only fixes the problem caused by the secret key representations in the form of floating-point numbers, but also solves the problem of existing a large number of equivalent secret keys [44] . 6) DD-PCIE does not use external random values and secret parameters, nor does it use the hash value of the plain-image as the secret key. Therefore, there is no practicability problem in the case that a large number of images need to be encrypted. 7) DD-PCIE utilizes the hash value of the plain-image to generate one generator of the multiplicative group Z * 257 , and makes each encryption step closely related to the plain-image, rather than using the hash value of the plain-image to generate or perturb chaotic system parameters. Therefore, once the secret key is selected, the chaotic sequences can be generated in advance and reused to improve the encryption efficiency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, this paper first describes the hash value of the plain-image and discrete logarithm used in DD-PCIE, and then briefly introduces the DNA sequence operation and 2D Logistic-sine-coupling map (2D-LSCM) [49] ; In Section III, this paper details the overall structure of DD-PCIE and each step of its encryption process; In Section IV, in addition to detailed common tests and comparative analyses with some recent chaotic image encryption algorithms, this paper also deeply and comprehensively analyzes the ability of DD-PCIE to resist common attacks, so as to verify and demonstrate the advantages of DD-PCIE; And in last section, the paper is concluded.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly introduce the SHA-256 hash value of the plain-image, discrete logarithm, DNA sequence operation, and 2D-LSCM used in DD-PCIE. Additionally, most of the test images used in this paper are from The USC-SIPI Image Database (http://sipi.usc.edu/database/), and a few images are standard test images commonly used in the literatures on chaotic image encryption. For the hardware and software configurations used in this paper, please refer to Table 4 .
A. SHA-256 HASH VALUE OF PLAIN-IMAGE
SHA-256 is a hash function presented by US National Security Agency [50] . For an input message up to 2 64 bits, SHA-256 can produce a hash value of 32 bytes. Even if the input message only undergoes one smallest change, i.e. one bit of it is inverted, the hash value generated by SHA-256 will change significantly. Since the sizes of plain-images that need to be encrypted are far smaller than 2 64 bits, and SHA-256 has a very high input sensitivity, we can use the hash value of the plain-image to improve the plain-image sensitivity and plain-image relevancy of the encryption process. Specifically, we use the hash value to generate one generator of the multiplicative group Z * 257 , update the plain-image, determine the encoding and decoding rules for the DNA sequence operation, and control the diffusion process. In this way, the equivalent key streams of DD-PCIE depend not only on the secret key, but also on the plain-image. Table 1 shows the significant changes of the hash value when the plain-image undergoes smallest changes. As can be seen from Table 1 , even if the lowest bit of only one pixel in 5.2.09.tiff is inverted, the generated hash value changes significantly. Therefore, using the hash value of the plain-image in the encryption process can greatly improve the plain-image sensitivity and plain-image relevancy of the encryption process. In addition, the calculation of the plain-image hash value is independent of the encryption process, and can be calculated in advance before the plain-image is encrypted, so the encryption efficiency will not be affected.
Specifically, DD-PCIE directly uses the previously calculated 32-byte plain-image hash value HV = HV 1 HV 2 . . . HV 32 (1)
as an input, where indicates that one hexadecimal value is concatenated by two hexadecimal values. In the encryption process, DD-PCIE uses these 32 bytes to enhance its plain-image sensitivity and plain-image relevancy. And in the decryption process, the decrypting party can use the hash value bytes directly sent by the encryption party to decrypt the cipher-image. Because SHA-256 is an irreversible one-way function, even if attackers obtain the hash value bytes by eavesdropping, they cannot recover the plain-image only with these bytes.
B. DISCRETE LOGARITHM
For a prime p and its corresponding multiplicative group Z * p , one can define the discrete logarithm as follows: If d ∈ Z * p satisfies n ≡ g d mod p, then d is said to be the discrete logarithm of n, namely, d ≡ (log g n) mod p, where g ∈ Z * p is a generator of Z * p , and n ∈ Z * p . In DD-PCIE, we use the prime 257 and its corresponding multiplicative group Z * 257 . Note that Z * 257 has as many as 128 generators, so we can use these generators to expand the key space of DD-PCIE and enhance its plain-image sensitivity and plain-image relevancy. In addition, in order not to jeopardize the encryption efficiency of the encryption process, we calculate the discrete logarithm values under different generators in advance, and save the results to the 2D matrix DL with the size of 128×256. In this way, DD-PCIE does not need to perform the complex discrete logarithm calculation, and only needs to directly access the corresponding elements of DL. For example, if one want to calculate the discrete logarithm of 107 under generator 147, that is, to calculate (log 147 107) mod 257, one can access DL(147, 107) to obtain the discrete logarithm value 93. Table 2 shows the discrete logarithm values of 101 ∼ 110 under 10 different generators.
DD-PCIE uses two generators, g K and g HV . Specifically, g K is from the secret key K, used to expand the key space and increase the complexity of the encryption process; g HV is determined by the hash value of the plain-image, as shown in g HV = ((HV 1 + HV 2 + . . . + HV 32 ) mod 128) + 1, (2) where HV 1 , HV 2 , . . . , HV 32 are from (1). The purpose of using g HV is to improve the plain-image sensitivity, plain-image relevancy, and complexity of the encryption process.
C. DNA SEQUENCE OPERATION
DNA computing is an emerging computing technology, compared with traditional electronic computing methods, it has the significant advantages such as the high parallelism, low power consumption, and high information density. The principle of DNA computing is not complicated, and is not fundamentally different from the binary operations of electronic computers in mathematical terms. To perform DNA computing, one first need to encode the binary sequence into bases. There are four bases, adenine (A), guanine (G), thymine (T), and cytosine (C). Obviously, it is to encode two binary bits into one base. Since the encoding rules must conform to the Watson-Crick base pairing rules, there are eight encoding rules available [9] , [10] , [20] , [23] . Table 3 lists all the available encoding rules.
D. 2D-LSCM AND CHAOTIC SEQUENCES
2D-LSCM is a combination of logistic map and sine map, which is defined as where i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , NI , NI is the number of iterations, x 0 and y 0 are the initial state values of 2D-LSCM, and their value ranges are [0, 1], x i and y i are the system state values generated by the i-th iteration of 2D-LSCM; γ ∈ [0, 1] is the control parameter of 2D-LSCM. Compared with many one-dimensional (1D) maps and hybrid improved maps, 2D-LSCM has better chaotic performance. Specifically, it has a wider chaotic range of γ ∈ (0, 1) and is hyper-chaotic in the range of γ ∈ (0, 0.34) ∪ (0.67, 1). And in 2D-LSCM, the dynamical degradation problem of chaotic systems is also well solved, which is caused by the finite representation precisions of computers [40] , [45] , [59] . When the representation precision reaches 10 −8 , the average cycle length of 2D-LSCM is as high as 4,455,734 [49] . In other words, the number of chaotic outputs can fully meet the need of encrypting common size images. Furthermore, the state value output of 2D-LSCM is also very uniform in the whole phase space and has excellent randomness. Therefore, 2D-LSCM is very suitable for image encryption. Before encrypting the plain-image with the size of M × N , we will iterate 2D-LSCM in three rounds by using x 1 0 , y 1 0 , γ 1 , x 2 0 , y 2 0 , γ 2 , x 3 0 , y 3 0 , γ 3 in the secret key in advance. Specifically, the first round of iterations use x 1 0 , y 1 0 , γ 1 . That is, x 1 0 , y 1 0 are used as the initial state values of 2D-LSCM, and γ 3 is used as the control parameter of 2D-LSCM. After discarding the system state values of first 100 iterations, the system state values generated by each subsequent iteration are added to the chaotic sequence CS 1 . In order to obtain CS 1 with the length of M ×N , we will continue to iterate the system M × N /2 + 1 times, where • returns the integer part of an operand. Next, the double-precision floating-point chaotic sequence CS 1 will be converted into the integer chaotic sequence (4) where i = 1, 2, . . . , M × N . Similarly, the second round of iterations use x 2 0 , y 2 0 , γ 2 as the system parameters of 2D-LSCM, and the obtained double-precision floating-point chaotic sequence CS 2 will be converted into the integer sequence ICS 2 . The elements of ICS 2 , ICS 2 (i) = CS 2 (i) × 10 15 mod 256 (5) have the same representation format as the pixels of the grayscale plain-image with 256 gray levels, where i = 1, 2, . . . , M × N . In the third round of iterations, the system parameters used are x 3 0 , y 3 0 , γ 3 . The elements of ICS 3 ,
obtained by the chaotic sequence CS 3 also have the same representation format as the grayscale plain-image pixels, where i = 1, 2, . . . , M × N .
III. SPECIFIC ENCRYPTION PROCESS OF DD-PCIE
This section provides a systematic and comprehensive description of DD-PCIE. While describing each encryption step, we also explain the motivation and purpose of designing it, and demonstrate and analyze its actual effect. The entire encryption process of DD-PCIE is shown in Fig. 1 . As can be seen from Fig. 1 , DD-PCIE is composed of three encryption steps, namely the plain-image-related permutation and update, plain-image-related DNA sequence operation, and plain-image-related diffusion. In this paper, please note that the XOR operations represented by are all the 8-bit XOR operation for unsigned integers.
A. PLAIN-IMAGE-RELATED PERMUTATION AND UPDATE
As we know, the confusion requirement is one of the basic requirements that modern cryptosystems must meet. The confusion requirement means that each bit of the secret key should affect as many cipher-image bits as possible [14] , [15] . The permutation operation is one of the means often used by researchers to achieve confusion, but permutation-only image encryption algorithms have been proven to be insecure, and even unable to withstand known-plaintext attack [46] . Therefore, DD-PCIE introduces the hash value of the plain-image in the permutation process, utilizing it to generate the equivalent permutation key streams and simultaneously update the pixel values. In this way, the permutation process of DD-PCIE depends not only on the chaotic sequence ICS 1 generated by the secret key K , but also on the plain-image PI . In addition, because of the adoption of the plain-imagerelated pixel value update, attackers can not arbitrarily utilize special plain-images to launch effective attacks [42] - [44] . Unlike the row-wise and column-wise permutations performed in some chaotic image encryption algorithms [27] , [51] , DD-PCIE performs every pixel permutation operation across the entire coordinate range. Specifically, DD-PCIE first stretches the plain-image PI with the size of M × N into the 1D plain-image sequence PIS, and then successively calculates the byte subscript
of the hash value HV and the permutation coordinate
where (4) . At the same time as the permutation operation is carried out, DD-PCIE also performs the pixel value update. In order to improve the encryption efficiency, DD-PCIE only performs the pixel value update every M pixel permutation operations. That is, if i mod M = 0, then
where g K is from the secret key K , g HV is from (2) . Otherwise, PIS(PC) = PIS(i). After the processing of (8) and (9), the plain-image sequence PIS is converted into the 1D permutated and updated image sequence PUIS.
In order to demonstrate the processing effect of the plainimage-related pixel permutation and update, we temporarily converted the obtained PUIS into the 2D form. Fig. 2 shows the processing effect for some common special plain-images. Obviously, after the plain-image-related pixel value update, attackers cannot utilize the special plain-images to ignore the permutation operations and simplify the subsequent encryption steps.
For normal plain-images, the plain-image-related pixel permutation and update proposed in this paper can achieve excellent confusion effect. As can be seen from Fig. 3 , the processed images resemble noise-images, and the correlation between the plain-image pixels is significantly reduced, and the position distribution of the cipher-image pixels has extremely high randomness.
B. PLAIN-IMAGE-RELATED DNA SEQUENCE OPERATION
As shown in Fig. 3 , the plain-image-related permutation and update can achieve excellent confusion effect and greatly reduce the pixel correlation, but the pixel value feature of the plain-image is still not eliminated. Therefore, DD-PCIE needs to further process the sequence PUIS to eliminate the original pixel value feature. As described in Section II-C, compared with electronic computing methods, DNA computing has the significant advantages such as low power consumption and high parallelism. Therefore, many researchers have proposed the chaotic image encryption algorithms using DNA computing technology [22] , [23] , [28] , [50] . However, some of these algorithms have been cracked due to the fixed encoding and decoding rules. Namely, the encoding and decoding rules are completely dependent on the secret key or only weakly related with the plain-image. Therefore, it is the designs of some encryption algorithms, rather than DNA computing, that have security defects. In order to improve the security while utilizing the merits of the DNA sequence operation, DD-PCIE introduces the plain-image-related DNA sequence operation. As shown in Fig. 4 , the plain-imagerelated DNA sequence operation can be further divided into three steps, namely, the plain-image-related DNA encoding, DNA XOR, and plain-image-related DNA decoding. And all of them are dependent on the chaotic sequence ICS 2 and the hash value HV of the plain-image.
1) PLAIN-IMAGE-RELATED DNA ENCODING
In order to overcome the defect that DNA encoding rules are invariant or only rely on the secret key, DD-PCIE introduces the hash value of the plain-image to determine the DNA encoding rules, and only changes the adopted encoding rule per M pixels to ensure the encryption efficiency. Moreover, in order to enhance the complexity and security of the encryption process, DD-PCIE also utilizes the discrete logarithm calculation when determining the encoding rule ER. When i mod M = 1, ER(j) = ((ICS 2 (i) + log g K (HV Sub 2 + 1))⊕ (log g HV (ICS 2 (i) + 1) + HV Sub 2 )) mod 8
where Sub 2 = (ICS 2 (i) mod 32) + 1
is the byte subscript of the hash value HV , i = 1, 2, . . . , M × N , j = i/M + 1, ER(j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8} is the encoding rule adopted per M pixels, ICS 2 is the integer chaotic sequence from (5), g K is the generator from the secret key K , g HV is the generator determined by HV .
2) DNA XOR DD-PCIE adopts the same encoding rules to encode the permutated and updated image sequence PUIS and ICS 2 . After the DNA encoding is completed, the DNA XOR operations are performed on the two DNA sequences.
3) PLAIN-IMAGE-RELATED DNA DECODING
In order to further improve the plain-image sensitivity, plain-image relevancy and security of the encryption process, DD-PCIE adopts different DNA encoding rules to decode the DNA sequence obtained after the DNA XOR operations. When i mod M = 1, DR(j) = ((ICS 2 (i) × log g K (HV Sub 2 + 1))⊕ (log g HV (ICS 2 (i) + 1) × HV Sub 2 )) mod 8 where DR(j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8} is the DNA encoding rule adopted to decode the DNA sequence obtained after the DNA XOR operations, it changes every time M intermediate cipher pixels are obtained by decoding.
After the plain-image-related DNA decoding is completed, we can get the intermediate cipher-image sequence ICIS generated by the plain-image-related DNA sequence operation. Similarly, in order to demonstrate the processing effect of the plain-image-related DNA sequence operation, we temporarily converted the obtained ICIS into the 2D form. Fig. 5 shows the processing effect of the plain-image-related DNA sequence operation for some plain-images. As can be seen from Fig. 5 , after the processing of the plain-image-related DNA sequence operation, the pixel value features of the plain-images are completely eliminated, and the pixel value distributions of the cipher-images are very uniform.
C. PLAIN-IMAGE-RELATED DIFFUSION
Just like the confusion requirement, the diffusion requirement is also one of the basic requirements that modern cryptosystems must meet [14] , [15] . Therefore, in order to improve the diffusivity and security, DD-PCIE introduces the plainimage-related diffusion. Different from the fixed diffusion operations adopted by some chaotic image encryption algorithms, the directions and methods of the plain-image-related diffusion are both dynamic and related to the plain-image. In this way, the ability of DD-PCIE to resist chosen-plaintext attack is further enhanced.
Firstly, DD-PCIE will determine the diffusion direction
according to the integer chaotic sequences ICS 1 , ICS 2 , ICS 3 , and the discrete logarithm sum
where M × N is the size of the plain-image, HV is the hash value of the plain-image, g K is from the secret key K , g HV is from (2) . If DD = 1, the forward diffusion is performed. Otherwise, the backward diffusion is performed. In other words, the diffusion direction is not fixed, but determined by both the secret key K and HV . Furthermore, when performing the forward diffusion, DD-PCIE also processes the pixels 
where FCIS is the final cipher-image sequence. When i = 2, 3, . . . , M × N , if i mod M = 1, then
mod 256. (16) Otherwise, it is further divided into two processing cases according to the diffusion selection parameter
where
That is, the specific diffusion method is determined by DSP 1 .
If DSP 1 = 1, then
Otherwise,
mod 256. (20) Similarly, when performing the backward diffusion, DD-PCIE also processes the pixels of ICIS in different ways. Specifically, when i = M × N , (21) where DLS is from (14) .
Otherwise, it is also further divided into two processing cases according to another diffusion selection parameter DSP 2 = (log g HV (ICS 3 (i) + 1))
where Sub 3 is from (18) . If DSP 2 = 1, then
− log g HV (FCIS(i+1)+1) mod 256. (24) Otherwise,
⊕ log g HV (FCIS(i + 1)+1)) mod 256. (25) Finally, DD-PCIE will convert the final cipher-image sequence FCIS into the 2D image, namely the cipherimage CI . Unlike some recent chaotic image encryption algorithms, the plain-image-related diffusion of DD-PCIE requires only one round of execution to ensure excellent diffusivity, plain-image sensitivity and plain-image relevancy. As shown in Fig. 6 , we first encrypted 5.2.08.tiff and 5.2.09.tiff, and inverted the lowest bit of the first pixel in 5.2.08.tiff and the lowest bit of the last pixel in 5.2.09.tiff respectively. Then, the changed plain-images are encrypted, and the difference-images between the cipher-images before and after the changes are also calculated.
As can be seen from Fig. 6 , in the case of performing only one round of the plain-image-related diffusion, even if only one bit of the plain-image is inverted, the corresponding cipher-image changes significantly. And this significant FIGURE 6. Processing effect of plain-image-related diffusion: (a1) 5.2.08.tiff; (a2) cipher-image of (a1); (a3) 5.2.09.tiff; (a4) cipher-image of (a3); (b1) image obtained by inverting lowest bit of first pixel of (a1); (b2) cipher-image of (b1); (b3) image obtained by inverting lowest bit of last pixel of (a3); (b4) cipher-image of (b3); (c1) difference-image between (a1) and (b1); (c2) difference-image between (a2) and (b2); (c3) difference-image between (a3) and (b3); (c4) difference-image between (a4) and (b4).
change is also independent of location. Therefore, the diffusion effect of DD-PCIE is better than some recent chaotic image encryption algorithms [24] - [26] , [49] . For example, in Fig. 6 of [49] , the diffusion effect shown is not only inadequate, but also depends on the location of the changed pixel. Thus, the plain-image-related diffusion designed in this paper have excellent diffusivity, plain-image sensitivity, and plain-image relevancy.
Since DD-PCIE is a symmetric encryption algorithm, its decryption process is the same as the encryption process, or the inverse process of the encryption process. Using the integer chaotic sequences ICS 1 , ICS 2 , ICS 3 generated in advance by the secret key K , and the hash value HV directly sent by the encryption party, the decryption party can easily decrypt the cipher-image. Since the specific decryption process is actually the inverse process of each encryption step, this paper does not repeat it here.
IV. SIMULATION TESTS
In Section III, this paper not only introduces each encryption step of DD-PCIE in detail, but also briefly explains and analyzes the excellent features of DD-PCIE through Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 5, and Fig. 6 . Below, this paper will further fully test and analyze DD-PCIE from the aspects of the key space, key sensitivity, pixel correlation, plain-image sensitivity, information entropy, pixel value distribution, and encryption efficiency etc. Additionally, in order to make the simulation tests without loss of generality, unless otherwise specified, we use the randomly generated secret keys to perform the simulation tests. Table 4 lists the hardware and software configurations used during the simulation tests.
A. KEY SPACE
As described in Section II-B and Section II-D, the secret key K of DD-PCIE consists of 10 parts, namely the generator g K and the system parameters x 1 0 , y 1 0 , γ 1 , x 2 0 , y 2 0 , γ 2 , x 3 0 , y 3 0 , γ 3 used by 2D-LSCM in three rounds of iterations. In order to make the representation of the secret key more standardized, and to avoid the problem indicated by Li et al. [40] , DD-PCIE defines the secret key in the form of a binary sequence. Specifically, referring to the floating-point representation defined in IEEE 754 [60] , DD-PCIE uses 52 binary bits to represent each system parameter of 2D-LSCM. Assuming that the 52 binary bits representing x 1 0 are a 1 a 2 . . . a 52 , then they can be converted into a decimal floating-point number as
For the other eight chaotic system parameters, similar conversions can be performed. Whereas for g K , it can be represented directly by seven binary bits. In this way, the secret key of DD-PCIE is the binary sequence of 52 × 9 + 7 = 475 bits. So far, the calculation of the key space sizes of chaotic image encryption algorithms generally takes the following two forms: 1) For the secret key specified by a binary sequence, if the length of the binary sequence is L, then the key space size is 2 L . 2) For the secret key specified by one or more decimal floating-point parameters, the product of the numbers of possible values of all parameters is the key space size. For example, if the secret key consists of two parameters a ∈ [1, 2], b ∈ [1, 2], and the computer representation precision is 10 −15 , then the key space size is S = 10 15 × 10 15 = 10 30 . Therefore, the key space size of DD-PCIE with only one round of iteration is 2 475 , and this is enough to withstand brute force attacks [14] , [15] . If we need to seek higher security, we can carry out two rounds of encryption iterations, and use different 2D-LSCM system parameters and generators in each round of encryption iterations. In this way, the key space size of DD-PCIE can reach 2 950 . Table 5 shows the comparison of DD-PCIE with some recent chaotic image encryption algorithms in terms of key space size. As we all know, if the key space size of an encryption algorithm is larger, the algorithm is more capable of resisting brute force attacks. As can be seen from Table 5 , the key space size of DD-PCIE is significantly larger than other algorithms. Therefore, DD-PCIE is superior to these algorithms in terms of the ability to resist brute force attacks.
B. ENCRYPTION OF COLOR IMAGES
Compared with grayscale images, color images are more widely used. Although only the encryption of grayscale images with 256 gray levels is discussed in Section III, it can be easily extended to the encryption of color images and the images with 16-bit or higher pixel depths. For examples, for the color images, we only need to encrypt the R, G, B channels of them separately. And for the images with 16-bit pixel depth, we can simply encrypt the upper eight bits and lower eight bits of the pixels respectively. In order to test the encryption and decryption effect of DD-PCIE on color images, we encrypted and decrypted some color images from The USC-SIPI Image Database. As can be seen from Fig. 7 , the algorithm successfully encrypted and decrypted these color images. The generated cipher-images are approximate to noise-images, whereas the decrypted images are completely consistent with the plain-images.
C. KEY SENSITIVITY
According to Shannon's suggestion, strong cryptosystems should have excellent confusion property. For a chaotic image encryption algorithm, the change of one bit in the secret key should lead to the changes of as many cipher-image bits as possible [14] , [15] . In this way, the statistical relationship between the secret key and the cipher-image can be concealed, thereby effectively resisting statistical attacks and differential attacks. This paper tests DD-PCIE with only one round of encryption iteration, and first randomly generates the secret key K R .
181598 VOLUME 7, 2019 The plain-image 7.1.02.tiff is then encrypted with K R . Next, make the smallest changes to the secret key. That is, the lowest bits of the binary sequences representing x 1 0 , y 1 0 , γ 1 , x 2 0 , y 2 0 , γ 2 , x 3 0 , y 3 0 , γ 3 , g K are respectively inverted to obtain the fine-tuning secret keys K 1 R , K 2 R , . . . , K 10 R . Finally, these fine-tuning secret keys are used to encrypt 7.1.02.tiff respectively, and the difference-images between the original cipher-image and the cipher-images generated by these fine-tuning secret keys are calculated.
As can be seen from Fig. 8 , even if only one smallest change occurs in each part of the secret key, the corresponding cipher-images change completely. Moreover, every difference-image between the cipher-images before and after each smallest change of the secret key is similar to a noise-image, and looks very similar to an normal cipherimage. In this regard, DD-PCIE is significantly better than some recent chaotic image encryption algorithms [24] , [25] , [27] , [49] . In order to quantitatively analyze these cipher-image changes, the number of pixel change ratio (NPCR) and unified average change in intensity (UACI) values between the cipher-images before and after each smallest change of the secret key are also calculated, as shown in Table 6 . NPCR and UACI are two indexes that are often used to quantitatively analyze the difference between two images, and their definitions are shown in
and
where C 1 and C 2 are two images with the size of M × N . As can be seen from Table 6 , the UPCR and UACI values between the original cipher-image and changed cipher-images are very close to those between the original cipher-image and a random-image, so DD-PCIE has excellent key sensitivity.
D. PIXEL VALUE DISTRIBUTION
Uneven pixel value distribution is one of the significant features of plain-images, which can be clearly seen from Fig. 3 and Fig. 5 . Unlike plain-images, because of the need to effectively resist attacks, the pixel value distributions of the cipher-images must be extremely uniform. That is to say, a secure image encryption algorithm must be able to significantly eliminate the pixel value distribution feature of the plain-image, thereby making the pixel value distribution of the cipher-image extremely uniform. In order to verify whether the pixel value distributions of the cipher-images generated by DD-PCIE is uniform, we plotted the pixel value distribution histograms of some plain-images and its cipherimages. As can be seen from Fig. 9 , the pixel values of the plain-images are very unevenly distributed and concentrated in relatively narrow regions. However, after the encryption processing of DD-PCIE, the pixel value distributions of the generated cipher-images are extremely uniform.
Moreover, in order to further verify the ability of DD-PCIE to resist attacks, we also conducted the variance analysis and chi-square test analysis on cipher-images. The variance of histogram is often used by researchers to quantitatively analyze the uniformity of images [10] , [63] , [64] . If the variance is smaller, the uniformity of the cipher-image is higher. The variance of histogram is presented as follows:
where I is the vector of the histogram values and I = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i 256 }, i j and i k are the numbers of pixels which gray values are equal to j − 1 and k − 1 respectively. We calculated the variances of histograms of one random-image, the 256 × 256 grayscale image Lena, and its cipher-image respectively, and compared them with the test results of [10] and [64] . As can be seen from Table 7 , the pixel value distribution of the plain-image is extremely uneven, while the pixel value distribution of the cipher-image of DD-PCIE is most uniform and closest to the random-image. Similarly, the chi-square test is also used by researchers to quantitatively analyze the uniformity of images [24] . Firstly, we can calculate the chi-square value of one cipher-image generated by DD-PCIE as follows:
where n i is the number of pixels whose value is i − 1, M × N is the size of the cipher-image, k is the number of all possible pixel values(k = 256 for grayscale images), and p = 1/k. Then, we can calculate the critical value of the chi-square test at the significant level α = 0.05. If the chi-square value of one cipher-image is less than the critical value, it is considered to pass the chi-square test, that is, the pixel value distribution of this cipher-images is very close to the uniform distribution. The relevant test results are shown in Table 8 . As can be seen from Table 8 , the chi-square values of all cipher-images are obviously less than the critical value 293.2478. Therefore, all these cipher-images have passed the chi-square test. In summary, DD-PCIE can effectively resist the attacks based on pixel value distribution.
E. INFORMATION ENTROPY
Information entropy is often used to measure the randomness of information sources. If the randomness or disorder of an information source is higher, then its information entropy is higher, and vice versa. For the information source s, its information entropy is defined as
where N is the total number of symbol s i , p(s i ) is the occurrence probability of symbol s i . For the grayscale images with 256 gray levels, the ideal value of cipher-image information entropy is 8. Table 9 lists the information entropies of some plain-images and their cipher-images. It can be seen that after the encryption processing of DD-PCIE, the information entropies of the generated cipher-images are very close to the ideal value of 8. Table 10 also shows the comparison between the information entropy test results of DD-PCIE and those of some recent image encryption algorithms. Compared with other algorithms, the information entropy of the Lena cipher-image generated by DD-PCIE is closer to the ideal value of 8. Compared with the information entropy measure described above, the local Shannon entropy (LSE) measure proposed by Wu et al. [65] overcomes several weaknesses of the former. Therefore, this measure is being used by more and more researchers to verify the randomness of cipher-images. The definition of LSE is
where b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b N are N randomly selected nonoverlapping image blocks, S is the number of pixels in each block, H (b i ) is the information entropy of b i . In order to better verify the randomness of the cipher-images generated by DD-PCIE, we also performed the LSE test on them. According to [65] , we choose the parameters N = 30, S = 1936, and the significance level α = 0.05. In this case, the ideal LSE value is 7.902469317. If the LSE value of one cipher-image is within the range (7.901901305, 7.903037329), then the cipher-image can be considered to pass the LSE test. The relevant test results are shown in Table 11 . As can be seen from Table 11 , compared with some recent image encryption algorithms, DD-PCIE has the LSE average closest to the ideal value, the highest LSE value stability, and the highest pass rate.
F. PIXEL CORRELATION
In the plain-image, the pixel correlation between adjacent pixels is extremely high. A secure image encryption algorithm should be able to reduce this correlation to a very low level close to zero [14] , [15] . For the pixel correlation between adjacent pixels, correlation coefficient (CC) is an index that is often used for quantitative analysis, and its definition is shown in
where x and y are the gray values of two adjacent pixels respectively, E(x) and D(x) are the expectation and variance of the grayscale value x respectively. In some plain-images and their cipher-images generated by DD-PCIE, 5000 pairs of adjacent pixels are randomly selected from the horizontal, vertical, diagonal, and opposite diagonal directions respectively to calculate the CCs. Table 12 shows the relevant test results.
As can be seen from Table 12 , after the encryption processing of DD-PCIE, the relatively higher CC absolute values (>0.79) in the plain-images have been significantly reduced to the minimum values close to 0 (<0.008). Moreover, Table 13   TABLE 12 . CCs of adjacent pixels in plain-images and corresponding cipher-images. also shows the comparison between the pixel correlation test results of DD-PCIE and those of some recent image encryption algorithms. Compared with other algorithms, the Lena cipher-image generated by DD-PCIE has the relatively lower or lowest CC absolute values.
Additionally, in order to more intuitively show the extremely high pixel correlation in the plain-image and the extremely low pixel correlation in the cipher-image generated by DD-PCIE, we plotted the correlation distribution charts of 5.2.08.tiff and its cipher-image in the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal directions. As can be seen from Fig. 10 , the plain-image has very high pixel correlation in all directions, but after the encryption processing of DD-PCIE, the pixel correlation in each direction has been almost completely eliminated.
G. PLAIN-IMAGE SENSITIVITY
As we all know, a secure image encryption algorithm should have extremely high plain-image sensitivity, otherwise cannot effectively resist differential attacks or plaintext attacks. In other words, even if the plain-image only undergoes one smallest change, namely the inversion of one pixel bit, the cipher-image must change significantly. In order to demonstrate the excellent plain-image sensitivity of DD-PCIE, many tests have been carried out in this paper. Firstly, we encrypt 5.2.10.tiff, 7.1.02.tiff, 7.1.03.tiff, boat.512.tiff, gray21.512.tiff, and ruler.512.tiff to get the corresponding cipher-images; Secondly, for each of these plainimages, one pixel is randomly selected, the lowest bit of the selected pixel is inverted, and then these plain-images with the smallest changes are all encrypted; Finally, the differenceimages between the original cipher-images and changed cipher-images are calculated.
As can be seen from Fig. 11 , although each of these plain-images has only one smallest change, the corresponding cipher-images change completely. And each difference-image between the original and changed cipherimages approximates a noise-image. Not only that, the quantitative differences between the original and changed cipher-images are also calculated, as shown in Table 14 .
According to Table 14 , the differences between the original and changed cipher-images are very close to the difference between the original cipher-image and a random-image. Moreover, as shown in Table 15 , compared with some recent image encryption algorithms, the NPCR and UACI average of DD-PCIE is closer to the ideal values of 99.6094% and 33.4635%, and the stability is better. 
H. RESISTANCE TO NOISE AND DATA LOSS
In the process of transmission, cipher-images are likely to be affected by noises or suffer data loss. In addition, attackers are also very likely to maliciously add noises to cipher-images or remove a part of data from cipher-images. Therefore, a robust image encryption algorithm should be able to resist such noise and occlusion attacks. In order to verify the ability of DD-PCIE to resist noise attacks, we specifically added the salt & pepper noises (SPN) with different densities to the cipher-image of 4.2.03.tiff, and then decrypted these (a2) cipher-image of (a1); (a3) image obtained by inverting lowest bit of pixel at (490,94) in (a1); (a4) cipher-image of (a3); (a5) difference-image between (a2) and (a4); (b1) 7.1.02.tiff; (b2) cipher of (b1); (b3) inverting lowest bit at (135,333); (b4) cipher of (b3); (b5) difference-image; (c1) 7.1.03.tiff; (c2) cipher of (c1); (c3) inverting lowest bit at (311,400); (c4) cipher of (c3); (c5) difference-image; (d1) boat.512.tiff; (d2) cipher of (d1); (d3) inverting lowest bit at (361,207); (d4) cipher of (d3); (d5) difference-image; (e1) gray21.512.tiff; (e2) cipher of (e1); (e3) inverting lowest bit at (73,37); (e4) cipher of (e3); (e5) difference-image; (f1) ruler.512.tiff; (f2) cipher of (f1); (f3) inverting lowest bit at (215,236); (f4) cipher of (f3); (f5) difference-image. contaminated cipher-images. As can be seen from Fig. 12 , the degrees of influences on the decrypted images are related to the noise densities, that is, the numbers of pixels in the cipher-images whose value change. When the noise density is relatively low, there is no significant difference between the decrypted image and original plain-image, which will not (b2) decrypted image of (a2); (b3) decrypted image of (a3); (b4) decrypted image of (a4); (b5) decrypted image of (a5); (b6) decrypted image of (a6).
hinder the normal use of the decrypted image. When the noise density is relatively high, most visual information can still be obtained from the decrypted image. Therefore, DD-PCIE can effectively resist noise attacks.
Similarly, in order to verify the ability of DD-PCIE to resist occlusion attacks, we also carried out the occlusion attack test on it. As can be seen from Fig. 13 , when the cipher-images suffer data loss, the extent to which the decrypted images are affected depends on the numbers of pixels lost. When the number of pixels lost is relatively small, there is no significant difference between the decrypted image and original plain-image, which will not hinder the normal use of the decrypted image. When the number of lost pixels is relatively large, most visual information can still be obtained from the decrypted image. Therefore, DD-PCIE can effectively resist occlusion attacks.
I. CLASSICAL TYPES OF ATTACKS
A secure image encryption algorithm must be able to withstand common attacks [14] , [15] . Among the four classical types of attacks on cryptosystems, namely ciphertext-only attack, known-plaintext attack, chosen-plaintext attack, and chosen-ciphertext attack, known-plaintext attack, chosen-plaintext attack, and chosen-ciphertext are most common ones used in cryptanalysis literatures on chaotic image encryption algorithms. In fact, chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext are the most powerful types of attacks [66] . If an chaotic image encryption algorithm can resist both types of attacks, then it can be considered secure.
It is assumed that attackers initiate chosen-plaintext attack against DD-PCIE, that is, they want to recover the plain-image PI corresponding to the intercepted cipher-image CI by chosen-plaintext attack. Under the conditions of chosen-plaintext attack, the attackers can encrypt the arbitrary plain-image PI a and obtain the corresponding cipher-image CI a by using the unknown secret key that remains unchanged. However, although the secret key does not change, PI a is different from PI . According to Section II-A, even if only one bit change occurs in the plainimage, the hash value of the plain-image changes significantly. Therefore, the two hash values HV , HV a used when encrypting the PI and PI a are significantly different from each other. As a result, the following changes will occur in the entire encryption process that generates the CI a : 1) According to (2) , the generator g HV used in the entire encryption process will change. Under different generators, even with the same value x, the discrete logarithm values of x will be different. 2) According to (8) , the permutation coordinate PC used for permutating each pixel will be different. 3) According to (9) , when a pixel value is updated, the update value used will change. 4) According to (10) , when encoding the permutated and updated image sequence PUIS and integer chaotic sequence ICS 2 , the encoding rules used will be different. 5) According to (12) , when the DNA sequence is decoded to obtain the intermediate cipher-image sequence ICIS, the decoding rules employed will vary. 6) According to (13) , the diffusion direction DD may be different when performing diffusion operations. 7) According to (15)- (20) , when performing the forward diffusion, the specific diffusion method will be different. 8) According to (21)- (25) , when performing the backward diffusion, the specific diffusion method will be different. Therefore, unless the hash values of the special plain-images chosen by the attackers during performing chosen-plaintext attack are the same as that of the original plain-image PI , the equivalent key streams obtained by the attacker are meaningless to recover PI . However, the probability that the attackers obtain the same hash value with a different plain-image is only 2 −256 = 8.6362 × 10 −78 , (c5) cipher-image with 1/4 data loss at center; (d1) decrypted image of (c1); (d2) decrypted image of (c2); (d3) decrypted image of (c3); (d4) decrypted image of (c4); (d5) decrypted image of (c5).
so it is not feasible to recover the plain-image by launching chosen-plaintext attack against DD-PCIE. Not only that, even if the attackers obtain a special plain-image PI a with the same hash value as the PI , since DD-PCIE introduces the discrete logarithm in the encryption process, and the encryption process is elaborately designed in a targeted manner by means of the discrete logarithm, the special plain-images commonly used in the past cannot simplify or degrade the encryption process. Taking the special plain-image PI 0 of all zero-value pixels as an example, and it is assumed that the hash value generated through PI 0 is exactly the same as that of the PI . Firstly, according to (9) and Fig. 2 , after the pixel value update, PI 0 will become a non-all-zero image. Therefore, the effect of ignoring the permutation process cannot be achieved by using PI 0 . Secondly, in the diffusion process, due to the targeted design in (13)-(25), the attackers cannot use special plain-images, such as PI 0 , to determine the mathematical relationship between the plain-image pixels and cipher-image pixels. The above analysis process is also applicable to the case where attackers initiate chosen-ciphertext attack, which will not be repeated here. In summary, DD-PCIE can resist four classical types of attacks.
J. ENCRYPTION EFFICIENCY
In addition to the security, the encryption efficiency is also an important index to determine whether an image encryption algorithm is practical. In order to improve the encryption efficiency, DD-PCIE improves the design of using the hash value to generate or perturb chaotic system parameters, which is used by some recent chaotic image encryption algorithms [9] - [12] , [28] . In this way, once the secret key is determined, chaotic sequences can be generated in advance and reused, thereby avoiding the time-consuming chaotic sequence generation overhead [16] , [40] . Similarly, the plain-image hash value can also be determined in advance. Therefore, unlike some recent chaotic image encryption algorithms, the encryption process of DD-PCIE does not include the generation of chaotic sequences and the calculation of the hash value. Whereas for the discrete logarithm, we calculate the discrete logarithm values under different generators in advance, and save the results to the 2D matrix DL. In this way, DD-PCIE does not need to perform complex discrete logarithm calculations, and only needs to directly access the corresponding elements of DL. On the other hand, in the encryption process of DD-PCIE, the DNA sequence operation has very high parallelism. Compared with the permutation and diffusion, the DNA sequence operation can be highly parallelized, so its operation time can be greatly reduced.
Next, we perform the computational complexity analysis on DD-PCIE. DD-PCIE is composed of three encryption steps, the plain-image-related permutation and update, plainimage-related DNA sequence operation and plain-imagerelated diffusion. We consider the addition, subtraction, multiplication, XOR, modulo operation, etc. as basic operations. In fact, with the help of the above design or improvements, DD-PCIE has indeed demonstrated the higher encryption efficiency than some recent image encryption algorithms in simulation tests. Table 16 lists the time required for DD-PCIE and some recent image encryption algorithms to encrypt the 256 × 256 grayscale image Lena.
V. CONCLUSION
Considering that chosen-plaintext attack is the reason why most chaotic image encryption algorithms are cracked, DD-PCIE applies the discrete logarithm and the hash value of the plain-image to the whole encryption process, thus greatly improving its ability to resist chosen-plaintext attack. Firstly, by performing the plain-image-related pixel value update, DD-PCIE makes it impossible for attackers to arbitrarily utilize a special plain-image to initiate effective attacks; Secondly, in the permutation process, the plain-image hash value also participates in the generation of permutation coordinates; Thirdly, the DNA encoding and decoding rules adopted in the plain-image-related DNA sequence operation are also dependent on the hash value; Finally, in the plain-image-related diffusion, the diffusion direction and the specific diffusion method are also related to the hash value. Not only that, by introducing the discrete logarithm, DD-PCIE also expands the key space and increases the complexity and plain-image relevancy of the encryption process, thus further improving its security.
Whereas for the encryption efficiency, firstly, DD-PCIE improves the way in which the plain-image hash value is used, instead of perturbing or generating chaotic system parameters through the plain-image hash value, thus simplifying the encryption process; Secondly, the discrete logarithms introduced by DD-PCIE can also be obtained by addressing the pre-determined 2D matrix, rather than performing complex discrete logarithm calculations; Finally, DD-PCIE also improves the parallelism of the encryption process by using the dynamically encoded DNA sequence operation.
In summary, DD-PCIE is able to effectively resist chosen-plaintext attack, and also has the extremely high security and encryption efficiency. In the future, we will further optimize the encryption process of DD-PCIE and introduce new technical means and design ideas, so as to further improve the security and practicability of it.
